Advertisements Which Identify  Brand X : A Trialogue on the Law and Policy by Gaughan, Lawrence D.
Fordham Law Review 
Volume 35 Issue 3 Article 3 
1967 
Advertisements Which Identify "Brand X": A Trialogue on the Law 
and Policy 
Lawrence D. Gaughan 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Lawrence D. Gaughan, Advertisements Which Identify "Brand X": A Trialogue on the Law and Policy, 35 
Fordham L. Rev. 445 (1967). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol35/iss3/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham 
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
Advertisements Which Identify "Brand X": A Trialogue on the Law and Policy 
Cover Page Footnote 
Assistant Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law; member of the Virginia and Montana 
Bars. 
This article is available in Fordham Law Review: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol35/iss3/3 
ADVERTISEMENTS WHICH IDENTIFY "BRAND X":
A TRIALOGUE ON THE LAW AND POLICY
LAWRENCE D. GAUGHAN*
[The scene is the office of F. Harlan Blackstone, a senior partner in a
large Wall Street law firm. A secretary has just ushered in two men. One
is Rudolf G. Hofmeister IV, who is vice-president in charge of marketing
for Hofmeister-Berg Breweries, Inc., of Milwaukee. He is accompanied
by Geoffrey Flagpole, the executive for the Hofmeister-Berg account with
a noted Madison Avenue advertising agency. The following conversation
ensues:]
BLACKSTONE: Good morning, gentlemen. What brings you to these
cloisters?
HoF EIsTER: Good morning, Harlan. Did you happen to see the tele-
vision program sponsored by the Glutz Brewing Company last night?
BLACKSTONE: No, I didn't. What went on?
HOFMEISTER: Glutz is one of our competitors, and their medium priced
beer, Glutz Premium, is the largest selling beer in the United States. Our
competitive brand, Hofmeister's Supreme, is third in national sales.
FLAGPOLE: The Glutz commercial showed four bottles of beer-theirs,
ours and the other two best sellers. A hand reached into the group and
picked out the bottle of Glutz, while the announcer said: "Here is a scene
which is repeated every day, all over America. Millions choose Glutz Pre-
mium over other brands of beer. Glutz outsells every other beer in the
United States. And for good reason: Glutz has flavor, real flavor that
other beers can't match. Flavor that comes from the choicest ingredients,
nurtured by the skill of master brewers. Glutz is the name you can count
on. So do as millions do: treat yourself to a Glutz."
HOFMEISTER: Our bottle and trademark were clearly visible to the
television audience. We want to know if there is anything we can do to
stop this commercial.
FLAGPOLE: And, if the law can't help us, we have some other ideas we
want to check out with you. The beer industry is too highly competitive
to let this one pass.
BLACKSTONE: Let me ask you a question first, Jeff. For years there
seemed to be a sort of taboo against the naming of competitors in national
advertising. When the competition was mentioned, it was called "Brand
X" or something like that. Brand X was the detergent which left white
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law; member of the
Virginia and Montana Bars.
1. This advertisement was suggested by the commercial described in note 39 infra.
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sheets slightly gray or the cleanser which didn't get all of the spots out.
Sometimes another epithet, such as "that greasy kid stuff," was substi-
tuted. But the reference was too vague and general to let the listener
or reader know what was meant. Now, in the past several years, we have
what seems to be a flurry of ads that name, show or otherwise identify
specific competitors or their products. What's afoot?
FLAGPOLE: Most of us, I suppose, had been afraid that if we named our
competitor we'd be giving him free publicity or evoking sympathy for
him. Some of my colleagues also assumed that it was illegal to do so.
Then along came a national car rental company with its challenge to
its competitor, "No. 1," and its insistence that: "We try harder." These
ads received a lot of attention. And the attention factor, you know, is an
advertising man's principal problem. It's really difficult to get people to
notice your advertising message. The average American is exposed to
hundreds of items of advertising each day. Of these, he ultimately acts
upon only a few. There is so much advertising in this country that people
build up a certain immunity to it.
BLACKSTONE: It's like learning to sleep at night when you live in a
noisy city. What you're saying is that these ads are currently so popular
because they get attention.
FLAGPOLE: Yes, and furthermore that an advertising man who doesn't
consider the potentialities of this type of advertising may be doing his
client a disservice.
HoFmEiSTER: I guess that I am one of the people who have assumed
that there was something illegal about naming your competition in ad-
vertising. Why can't I sue Glutz for disparaging my product?
BLACKSTONE: The law makes it extremely difficult to win a disparage-
ment case as plaintiff. To start with, what can you claim to be disparag-
ing about the Glutz commercial?
HO'MEISTER: That's easy. Since they showed a bottle of our beer when
they said that Glutz has flavor that other beers can't match, they're
really saying that Hofmeister's can't match the flavor of Glutz. Now,
they know that isn't true.
FLAGPOLE: Rudy, we call such general statements of product superior-
ity "puffing" in the advertising industry. I had understood that they were
all right legally as long as there is no misrepresentation of specific facts.
HOFMEISTER: Yes, but doesn't it make a difference when you refer to
a competitive product?
BLACKSTONE: Perhaps it should, Rudy, but Jeff is correct in suggesting
that it doesn't. "Puffing" is also a legal term. It includes all sorts of exag-
gerated and high-blown claims of superiority and superlatives for one's
goods or services, provided that they are sufficiently broad and general
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that the public will take them to be the opinion of the maker or seller
rather than provable fact.2
HOFmEISTER: If your competitor names you in his advertising, though,
isn't that unfair competition?
BLACKSTONE: No, at least not without further facts which would make
it such. The terminology which is used in this area of the law is rather
tricky, even to lawyers. We use terms such as "trade libel," "disparage-
ment" and "unfair competition" in varying ways, often losing track of
their individual origins and content. These terms have curious similar-
ities and dissimilarities. Let's start by trying to define "disparagement."
What does that mean to you, Jeff?
FLAGPOLE: Any attack upon a competitor or his product which is un-
true or unfair.3
BLACKSTONE: Many of your colleagues in advertising would define it
in approximately the same words. But to be legally precise, we must say
that it describes a common law action for the damage proved to have
been caused to another by a deliberate and unprivileged attack upon his
product which contains objectively demonstrable misstatements. 4
2. Prosser, Torts § 104, at 738-39 (3d ed. 1964). To the effect that "puffing" does not
cease to be privileged when it is comparative see Testing Syss., Inc. v. Magnaflux Corp,
251 F. Supp. 286 (E.D. Pa. 1966); Smith-Victor Corp. v. Sylvania Elec. Prods., Inc., 242
F. Supp. 302 (N.D. Ill. 1965).
A good statement of the generally accepted principle as to "puffing" is found in the
works of a leading French writer on the law of unfair competition: "Unfair competition
is not seen in the act of one who seeks by the use of grandiose words in his posters and
advertisements to dazzle the public on the importance of his business and the claimed ad-
vantages of his products, where there is no precise and well-defined allegation in the
charlatanism of his publicity." Pouilet, Trait6 des marques de fabrique et de la concur-
rence dloyale en tous genres § 1185 (6th ed. 1912).
3. Flagpole has given a broad, layman's definition of "commercial disparagement."
Prosser calls it the "tort which passes by many names." Prosser, Injurious Falsehood: The
Basis of Liability, 59 Colum. L. Rev. 425 (1959).
4. Compare the following definition of the conditions for actionable disparagement:
"[One who, with intent to injure another's business, makes a false assertion which dis-
parages the quality of the other's product is liable for pecuniary damage directly caused
thereby." Note, The Law of Commercial Disparagement: Business Defamation's Impotent
Ally, 63 Yale L.J. 65, 75 (1953). This definition, like most others, does not distinguish
between competitive and noncompetitive disparagement. In actions between competitors,
it is too broad in that it does not take account of the effects of the competitive privilege.
Good faith comments about products by independent consumer testing services, such as
those listed in notes 97-98 infra, should also be privileged.
In addition to the note cited above, there have been a number of articles in legal pe-
riodicals concerning the common law action for disparagement. Eg., Developments in the
Law-Competitive Torts, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 888, 893-905 (1964); Note, Disparagement
Under the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act, 51 Iowa L. Rev. 1066 (1966) (despite
the title, much of the article deals with decisional law). Bibliographies of other articles
19671
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HOFMEISTER: Well, isn't that what the Glutz ad does?
BLACKSTONE: Not in the eyes of the law courts. Remember, Glutz is
your competitor.
HOFMEISTER: Doesn't that make it worse for them?
BLACKSTONE: One might suppose so, but the common law is otherwise.
In a disparagement action, general comparisons between products or ser-
vices are said to be privileged when made by a competitor.'
HOFMEISTER: Even when they are untrue, or where there is no honest
belief in their truth?
BLACKSTONE: Yes, unless you can demonstrate that there are specific
factual claims which are untrue.' Some of the older cases go even further
and say that any comparative disparagement is privileged when made by
a competitor.7
HOFMEISTER: Is there any reason for such a position?
BLACKSTONE: It is said that if the rule were otherwise, the judicial
machinery would be exploited by being required to make judgments as
to the truth or falsity of competitive claims, which would then be used
for advertising purposes.8 This reason may have some merit in cases
of competitive "puffing." Anyway, the consumers probably take such
assertions by competitors with a grain of salt.
appear in Oppenheim, Cases on Unfair Trade Practices 310 (2d ed. 1965), and Janssen,
Commercial Disparagement, 53 Trademark Rep. 274, 298-303 (1963). Other useful sources
include 2 Callmann, Unfair Competition and Trade-Marks ch. 11 (2d ed. 1950); 3 Re-
statement, Torts ch. 28 (1938).
S. The modern version of the competitive privilege is stated in 3 Restatement, Torts
§ 649 (1938) as follows: "A vendor . . . is privileged to make an unduly favorable com-
parison of the quality of his own . . . chattels or other things, with the quality of the
competing ... chattels or other things of his competitor, although he does not believe that
his own things are superior to those of his competitor, if the comparison does not contain
assertions of specific unfavorable facts."
The classic analysis of the questions of malice and privilege in disparagement actions
is found in Smith, Disparagement of Property (pts. 1-2), 13 Colum. L. Rev. 13, 121
(1913). Apparently this article became the basis for the Restatement positions on these
subjects. Prosser, supra note 3, at 430.
6. 3 Restatement, Torts §§ 626, 649 (1938).
7. The older authorities are summarized in National Ref. Co. v. Benzo Gas Motor Fuel
Co., 20 F.2d 763, 769 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 275 U.S. 570 (1927).
8. To examine the truth or falsity of comparative claims between competitors would
only encourage "the pernicious practice of bringing actions for mere purposes of advertising."
Hubbuck & Sons v. Wilkinson, Heywood & Clark, Ltd., [1899] 1 Q.B. 86, 93 (C.A.). This
statement was based upon the remarks of Lord Herschell in White v. Mellin, [1895] A.C.
154, 165. Compare the following statement from an early American case: "To say that the
watches manufactured by the plaintiff are inferior to those made by any other particular
manufacturer, can never be held actionable where no special damages results therefrom,
without embarrassing the freedom of judgment in matters of private concern, and making
errors of opinion in relation to the common and necessary transactions of life a fruitful
source of litigation." Tobias v. Harland, 4 Wend. 537, 541 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jud. 1830).
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FLAGPOLE: Doesn't the privilege to make general claims of comparative
superiority almost wipe out the chances of bringing a disparagement ac-
tion against a competitor?
BLACKSTONE: Not if the modern authorities are followed. A demon-
strable misstatement of fact would not come within the privilege, and,
thus, the absence of a competitive relationship would be evidence of an
intent to harmY
FLAGPOLE: The problem is that a specific misstatement of fact amounts
to false advertising, and large advertisers just can't afford that. The
American consumer is becoming too sophisticated; if he is burned once,
he will lose faith in the advertiser's corporate image. A large advertiser
who can't prove his comparative statements of fact will keep them gen-
eral and not go beyond "puffing."
BLACKrSTONE: There are a number of Federal Trade Commission cases,
including some recent ones, which indicate that some large advertisers
aren't as reluctant as you might think to stray beyond the borders of
honest advertising."° But I agree that one of the "big boys" will seldom
if ever be willing to risk demonstrable falsity in ads which refer to the
competition. There's just too much chance of a damaging reply.
HOFMEISTER: Suppose that Glutz advertised that their beer is aged
longer than ours. We can show that to be untrue. So then can we get
damage for the injury to our product's reputation?
BLACKSTONE: Would that it were that simple! Unfortunately, there
would remain the problem of proving special damage.
FLAGPOLE: What does that mean?
BLACKSTONE: Some of the courts in disparagement cases have gone
so far as to say that the plaintiff must be able to name the customers
that he lost or to specify the sales that he didn't make. For a business
of any size, that will almost always be an impossible burden of proof.
Other courts are more reasonable and will permit evidence of a general
loss of business."
HOFMEISTER: Does this mean that I win if I can show that my sales
have declined in the month or two after the disparaging advertisement?
BLACKSTONE: No. Even the relatively more liberal authorities will
9. For a resolution of the seeming inconsistency between the malice requirement and
the competitive privilege in disparagement cases see Oppenheim, op. cit. supra note 4, at 362.
An interesting example of such a resolution is found in Testing Syss., Inc. v. Magnaflux
Corp., 251 F. Supp. 286 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
10. Support for this observation is found in a perusal of the names of the corporate
respondents in FTC proceedings based upon deceptive advertising. See generally 2 Trade
Reg. Rep. 111 7521-7942.
11. The problem of the special damage requirement in disparagement actions has been
explored in several student notes. E.g., Developments in the Law-Competitive Torts, 77
Harv. L. Rev. 888, 899 (1964); Note, 47 Cornell L.Q. 92 (1961); Note, 17 Hastings L.J.
1967]
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require you to show that, given the nature of your business, it's impos-
sible to present more specific proof of your losses. 2 Also, you will have
to show that your losses were naturally and directly caused by the dis-
paraging ad and not by other factors.' 3
FLAGPOLE: Why, that's like asking a fisherman to prove exactly why
he didn't catch as many fish as he usually does. 14
BLACKSTONE: I can't think of a better way to describe the way in
which the special damage requirement usually works. Many lawyers con-
sider it to be the biggest barrier to winning a disparagement action."
HOFMEISTER: Is "disparagement" the same as "trade libel?"
BLACKSTONE: Often the two terms are used as if they were inter-
changeable. The difference is that to a lawyer "trade libel" may also imply
an action for damages for the defamation of a person in his business or
trade."'
HOFMEISTER: Why is this any different from disparagement?
BLACKSTONE: In theory, at least, the distinction is clear. If the plain-
tiff's goods or products are attacked, his cause of action (if he has one)
is for disparagement. It may be, however, that an insult to the plaintiff's
goods is so phrased as to really impugn his honesty or integrity as a
businessman, or to charge him with base, immoral or illegal business
methods. In such a case, it is defamation rather than disparagement.' 7
HOFMISTER: Isn't every disparagement of a product really an assault
upon its maker or seller?
BLACKSTONE: Perhaps it is, in a sense. In order to be defamatory,
however, the statement must be of such a nature as to bring the plaintiff
into hatred, contempt, ridicule or disrepute.18 When you say that a prod-
394 (1965); Note, 23 Ohio St. L.J. 167 (1962); Comment, 18 U. Chi. L. Rev. 114 (1950);
Comment, 63 Yale L.J. 65, 90 (1953).
12. E.g., Erick Bowman Remedy Co. v. Jensen Salsbery Labs., Inc., 17 F.2d 255, 259-62
(8th Cir. 1926); 3 Restatement, Torts § 633, comment f (1938). But see Dale Sys., Inc.
v. Time, Inc., 116 F. Supp. 527 (D. Conn. 1953).
13. An example of a case in which the causation requirement was held to bar recovery
is Houston Chronicle Publishing Co. v. Martin, 64 S.W.2d 816 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1933).
14. This remark was suggested by Comment, Libel and Slander-Disparagement of
Product-Expanding Protection Against Trade Libel, 7 Vii. L. Rev. 271, 274 n.15 (1961).
15. See Comment, 63 Yale L.J. 65, 93 (1953).
16. Green, Malone, Pedrick & Rahl, Cases on Injuries to Relations 188-90 (1959).
17. Most of the articles on disparagement, note 4 supra, deal with the distinction be-
tween disparagement and defamation. A concise summary of the cases is found in Oppen-
heim, op. cit. supra note 4, at 322-23. For a fuller discussion see Hibschman, Defamation
or Disparagement?, 24 Minn. L. Rev. 625 (1940). Two recent New York cases illustrate
the narrowness of the distinction. Compare Harwood Pharmacal Co. v. National Broad-
casting Co., 9 N.Y.2d 460, 174 N.E.2d 602, 214 N.Y.S.2d 725 (1961) (libel per se), with
Drug Research Corp. v. Curtis Publishing Co., 7 N.Y.2d 435, 166 N.E.2d 319, 199 N.Y.S.2d
33 (1960) (disparagement, not actionable because no special damage).
18. E.g., Prosser, op. cit. supra note 2, § 106, at 756.
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uct is poor or inferior, normally all that you are saying is that its maker
or seller lacks skill or judgment. Let me illustrate the difference. Rudy,
you're a brewer. If someone falsely charges that you are using a short-
cut process or cheap ingredients which endanger the health of people
who drink your beer, that is defamation. But if he untruthfully says that
your beer tastes bad, or not as good as his or someone else's, then it's
disparagement, if anything.
FLAGPOLE: Why does it make any difference whether it's one or the
other?
BLACKSTONE: Both are common law actions for damages, but there
are important differences in proof. 9 In a defamation action, the plaintiff
is not required to prove malice or special damage. The malice is implied
from the defamatory statement, and only general evidence of the injury
to the plaintiff's reputation is necessary. A person's reputation is deemed
to have intrinsic value, while damage to a product is measured only
by actual demonstrable loss. In addition...
FLAGPOLE: Can a corporation be defamed?
BLACKSTONE: Yes, that was established long before people started to
talk about the "corporate image."' But it reflects the same idea. The
law views a corporation as a person.
FLAGPOLE: I'm not sure that I agree with the distinction. Billions of
dollars are spent every year in this country on advertising designed to
build up good will for products." It is not unusual to create an adver-
tising campaign around some idea designed to give a product a certain
"personality." An example would be Esso's "Put a tiger in your tank" ads.
A good job of disparagement may tarnish a product's image far beyond
any price tag for damages which you might be able to prove in court.--"
BLACKSTONE: Yes, I suppose that the distinction is a little old-fash-
ioned, but the courts still adhere to it. Remember the lines from Othello:
"Who steals my purse steals trash; 'tis something, nothing;/ 'Twas mine,
'tis his, and has been slave to thousands;/ But he that filches from me
19. The differences are summarized in 3 Restatement, Torts, Introductory Note to
Div. VI, at 323 (1938).
20. For early examples of cases where a corporatiol recovered in defamation for at-
tacks upon its chattels see American Book Co. v. Gates, I5 Fed. 729 (C.C.S.D. Iowa 1898);
Ohio & M. Ry. v. Press Publishing Co., 48 Fed. 206 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1891).
21. Total advertising expenditures in the United States for 1966 are estimated at
$16,810,000,000. Advertising Age, Dec. 19, 1966, p. 54.
22. "The bonds of personal confidence are thus very often broken, and businessmen
strive to create a new tie, substituting for personal confidence a confidence in products, in
their qualities of durability, of appearance, of price: and this through the intensive use




my good name/ Robs me of that which not enriches him/ And makes
me poor indeed. '23
HOFMEISTER: You were telling us why it makes a difference whether
a case is defamation or disparagement.
BLACKSTONE: In a defamation case, as I was about to say, the burden
is on the defendant to show the truth of the statement as a defense. In
a disparagement action, the plaintiff must prove that it is untrue. Since
the line between truth and falsity is not always clear in these cases, the
burden of proof may be an important factor. 4
HOFMEISTER: Who decides whether a case is defamation or disparage-
ment?
BLACKSTONE: Normally a jury, after having been instructed by the
judge as to the distinction. I'm assuming, of course, that the plaintiff has
either brought his action as one for defamation or has pleaded defamation
and disparagement in the alternative. Still, there have been only a rela-
tive handful of cases in this country where an attack upon a product has
been held to be defamatory. There have been even fewer cases where
liability for disparagement has been recognized.
FLAGPOLE: The chances that any large advertiser would be guilty of
defamation are pretty slim. If an ad is so aggravated, strident or insulting
that a jury would think it defamatory, it would just drive trade to the
injured competitor in sympathy. Consumers have a sense of fair play
which would make such an ad offensive to them.
BLACKSTONE: On top of that, it is highly unlikely that a comparative
claim of product superiority would ever be held to be defamatory. Fur-
thermore, it is customary among large advertisers and agencies, as well
as among many smaller ones, to have advertisements checked by a lawyer
before release. So the defamation cases in recent years have usually in-
volved local advertisers who apparently hadn't bothered to get a legal
opinion." Occasionally one of the bigger corporations just plain goofs
and is held liable. 6
23. Iago in Shakespeare's Othello, act III, scene 3, 11. 157-61.
24. A further effect of the distinction is of historical importance; it was not until 1874
that disparagement was expressly recognized as a separate cause of action. Western Counties
Manure Co. v. Lawes Chem. Manure Co., L.R. 9 Ex. 218 (1874). Even after the advent
of a separate action for disparagement, however, the problems of proof in such an action
have been so serious that in almost every case a plaintiff who is unable to prove defama-
tion has for all practical purposes lost his case.
25. Rosenberg v. J. C. Penney Co., 30 Cal. App. 2d 609, 86 P.2d 696 (Dist. Ct. App.
1939); Cosgrove Studio & Camera Shop, Inc. v. Pane, 408 Pa. 314, 182 A.2d 751 (1962).
These cases furnish good examples of situations in which attacks upon goods or services
may be held to be defamatory. But see Shaw Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. Des Moines Dress
Club, 215 Iowa 1130, 245 N.W. 231 (1932).
26. An example of such a "goof" is found in Harwood Pharmacal Co. v. National Broad-
casting Co., 9 N.Y.2d 460, 174 N.E.2d 602, 214 N.Y.S.2d 725 (1961).
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HOFMEISTER: Where does unfair competition fit in? Isn't it unfair for
my competitor to use my product and trademark in his advertising?
BLACKSTONE: Of all of the terms that we have mentioned, "unfair
competition" is the most imprecise and difficult to defineY Even if we
ignore its application to the antitrust field, we are forced to recognize
that it takes in a real diversity of situations, ranging from trademark
infringement to stealing trade secrets to violation of state fair trade laws.
It's impossible to describe comprehensively the variety of subjects which
are grouped together under unfair competition without destroying the
usefulness of the definition as to any one of them. Also, it is feared that
any attempt at a general definition might leave loopholes which would
permit a clever schemer to evade the spirit of the legal protection. Still,
the elements of proof and remedies available in an unfair competition
action are almost always determined by precedent or legislation dealing
with the particular type of unfair conduct. A court doesn't just simply
ask whether the defendant was competing unfairly in the case at hand.
There's a lot more to it than that.
FLAGPOLE: What if the unfair conduct charged is disparagement by a
competitor?
BLACKSTONE: If the plaintiff only seeks damages, it would be a law
case and would be decided as I have indicated. However, if he asks for an
injunction, then the limitations of the common law actions don't necessar-
ily apply. Equity has a certain logic of its own. Courts sitting in equity
are responsible for many of the major developments in the law of unfair
competition. It is difficult, though, to set forth exactly the principles
which govern injunctive relief for disparagement. There aren't very many
reported cases where competitive disparagement has been treated as un-
fair competition. Still, I would guess that under the law of most states,
you can obtain an injunction against a competitor who threatens or con-
tinues to publish material misstatements which are injurious or likely to
be injurious to the good will of your business, products or services. The
more aggravated the nature of the misstatements, the more likely you are
to get an injunction. -8
27. The notion is "too broad . .. and ... too imprecise to permit one to give, in a
few words, an exact idea of its contours and substance." Mfermillod, op. cit. supra note 22,
at 3. It is impossible to construct any useful and brief definition of "unfair" in a competi-
tive context. In addition, there are the cases in which liability for unfair competition has
been found despite the absence of competition between the parties in any real sense. 1
Callmann, op. cit. supra note 4, at 87.
A selective bibliography of reference sources on unfair competition is found in Oppen-
heim, op. cit. supra note 4, at 1.
28. The following recent notes considered the availability of injunctive relief in dis-
paragement cases, based upon a theory of unfair competition: Developments in the Law-
1967]
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FLAGPOLE: Can disparagement ever be enjoined when it is not competi-
tive?
BLACKSTONE: Yes, but not on a theory of unfair competition. There is
authority for enjoining disparaging statements which are made in breach
of a contract or fiduciary obligation, or are malicious and unjustified,
or involve coercion, intimidation or extortion. Of course, the presence
of competition in these situations will increase the likelihood that an
injunction will issue.2 9
FLAGPOLE: Isn't there a constitutional problem when an injunction
would restrain the defendant in advance from speaking or writing some-
thing?
BLACKSTONE: By its very nature the injunction involves a prior re-
straint. For this reason the constitutional question which you raise has
worried a number of courts. During the last century and the earlier part
of this one, the constitutional privileges of free speech and press were
the basis for a denial of injunctive relief against disparagement in many
cases.3 0 Legal writers of this century have been critical of the earlier cases,
pointing out that the constitutional privilege was not designed to protect
mere commercial advertisements." The United States Supreme Court
seems to agree with them,32 but the constitutional argument may condition
a court's discretion to grant an injunction even in cases where it is not
thought to be an absolute bar.'
FLAGPOLE: If I understand correctly, a single judge may issue an in-
junction without a trial by jury. Isn't there a serious danger in permitting
him to act as an advance censor of advertising?
BLACKSTONE: Not really. If he abuses his discretion, or makes a de-
cision which is arbitrary or unsupported by the facts, it may be reversed
Competitive Torts, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 888, 902 (1964); Note, 51 Iowa L. Rev. 1066, 1071
(1966).
Proof of special damage is generally considered unnecessary in cases where equitable
relief against disparagement is based upon unfair competition. Royer v. Stoody Co., 192
F. Supp. 949 (W.D. Okla. 1961); H. E. Allen Mfg. Co. v. Smith, 224 App. Div. 187, 229
N.Y. Supp. 692 (4th Dep't 1928).
29. See generally 2 Nims, Unfair Competition and Trade-Marks ch. 17 (4th ed. 1947).
Illustrative cases are collected in 2 Callmann, op. cit. supra note 4, at 691-704.
30. The classic case of such a restrictive approach is Marlin Fire Arms Co. v. Shields,
171 N.Y. 384, 64 N.E. 163 (1902).
31. The leading article is Pound, Equitable Relief Against Defamation and Injuries
to Personality, 29 Harv. L. Rev. 640 (1916).
32. E.g., Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
33. Perhaps the best example of how the constitutional consideration may militate
against the imposition of prior restraint, even though the court refuses to decide the
constitutional question, is found in Scientific Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 124 F.2d 640 (3d Cir.
1941).
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upon appeal. Furthermore, advertising differs in many ways from the
expression of political, religious, economic, philosophical, literary or
artistic ideas and opinions. Its main motive is a purely self-serving one-
to sell. If advertising were under the umbrella of constitutional protec-
tion against prior restraint, then not even false advertising could be en-
joined. The cease and desist orders of the FTC likewise couldn't be used
against false advertising.
FLAGPOLE: "So much the better," said the Big Bad Wolf. But tell me,
would it be unconstitutional to enjoin a true advertisement?
BLACKSTONE: There have been a number of situations where restric-
tions have been upheld even where the advertising was not materially
false. A defendant's loss of his constitutional privilege may be based upon
his express or implied agreement, aggravating circumstances such as
extortion, or the presence of other elements of public policy. 4 An example
of the latter involves me; I am not permitted to advertise my services
as a lawyer. Still, in a case where an advertiser had presented true, use-
ful information concerning his competitor's product, the constitutional
privilege might pose a serious obstacle to the issuance of an injunction.
HOFm ISTER: How is untruth determined in an action for an injunc-
tion?
BLACKSTONE: The cases aren't very explicit as to what constitutes
untruth. Equity cases tend to be decided more on their own peculiar
facts-that is, less categorically. The principles and guidelines are usually
broader and the question of burden of proof as to any issue is less impor-
tant than at law. But to answer your question as well as I can, I would
assume that the plaintiff would have to show that his competitor's adver-
tisement would tend to mislead the consumer in some material or sub-
stantial respect. 5
HoFpEIsTER: And so again the Glutz ad, being as you say "puffing,"
wouldn't qualify?
BLACKSTONE: No, I'm afraid not.
HOFMISTER: We have been talking about disparagement. But what
about Glutz's use of our trademark? Isn't it illegal for a competitor to
use your trademark to help sell his product?
34. Note, Freedom of Expression in a Commercial Context, 78 Harv. L. Rev. 1191
(1965). Examples of cases where the court did not appear to consider the question of
truth are Menard v. Houle, 298 Mass. 546, 11 N.E.2d 436 (1937); West Willow Realty
Corp. v. Taylor, 23 Misc. 2d 867, 198 N.Y.S.2d 196 (Sup. Ct. 1960); Saxon Motor Sales,
Inc. v. Torino, 166 Misc. 863, 2 N.Y.S.2d 885 (Sup. Ct. 1938). None of these cases in-
volved unfair competition.
35. E.g., Royer v. Stoody Co., 192 F. Supp. 949 (W.D. Okla. 1961); Old Investors &
Traders Corp. v. Jenkins, 133 Misc. 213, 232 N.Y. Supp. 245 (Sup. Ct. 1928), af'd, 225
App. Div. 860, 233 N.Y. Supp. 845 (1st Dep't 1929).
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FLAGPOLE: I might say, Harlan, that a number of people are in trouble
if Rudy's suggestion is correct. Advertisements which show competitors'
trademarks are not uncommon these days. Let me show you the little
file I have been keeping of ads which refer to the competition.
BLACKSTONE: (Takes the file and examines it.) This is very interest-
ing. These advertisements seem to fall into at least two distinct types.
In some of them, the advertised product is not as well-known as that of
the competitor. The advertiser starts out by praising the competing mer-
chandise, albeit sometimes rather faintly. Then he proceeds to switch the
interest to his own goods or to indicate their advantages.37 At times, he
attempts to do the latter by factual comparisons, even some quite specific
ones.3" The Glutz commercial falls in the other class. There it is the
advertiser's product which is as well or better known than the others. So
usually he confines himself to more general statements as to the compar-
ative superiority or popularity of his own brand."' I note that there are
ads in each category which do not name or picture the competing product
or its trademark, at least directly.4"
36. The collection of clippings used in the writing of this article is on file with the
Fordham Law Review.
37. Illustrative of this type of advertisement is the ad of the National Brewing Co.
for its "Premium Beer." The headline is: "Wherein ...our proud premium brew from the
U.S.A. comes to grips with the imported beers." A bottle of National Premium is shown
beside a bottle of Li5wenbriu, and this scene is repeated with bottles of Heineken and
Tuborg. The copy relates how the majority of a panel of more than 1,400 beer drinkers
found that the advertised beer was at least as good as that of each of the named com-
petitors. Washington Post, May 22, 1966 (Potomac), p. 24.
A somewhat similar advertisement is the magazine ad for Hudson's Bay Scotch, described
in Commentary, Naming Competitors in Ads: Forthright, Fair, Foolish?, Printers' Ink,
Jan. 28, 1966, p. 32. On one side of the page, over the caption "Now that you have
acquired a taste for scotch . . ." are shown a dozen bottles of competing brands, each
with the cap removed. Some of the labels are clearly visible. The advertiser's product ap-
pears opposite, with the caption "you are ready for Hudson's Bay."
38. One of the most specific of such advertisements used so far has been the ad for
Simca, a French-made automobile, in Ladies' Home Journal, June, 1966, p. 51. The ad
pictures a Simca parked in front of a Volkswagen in such a manner as to take full ad-
yantage of foreshortening. The title reads: "For the price of a VW you get: 2 extra doors.
More room inside. A 5-year/S0,000-mile warranty. More horsepower. And $21 In change."
The copy elaborates on these and other specific factual comparisons between the two au-
tomobiles.
39. The prototype for this kind of ad is a television commercial for Gillette stainless
steel blades. The picture shows the advertiser's product together with those of three leading
competitors. While a hand reaches in and picks out the Gillette package, the announcer
points out that Gillette double-edged stainless steel blades outsell all of the others combined.
This commercial was described in Time, Aug. 20, 1965, p. 70.
40. An example is the advertisement of Bristol-Myers for its new seltzer tablet, Resolve,
designed to compete with Alka-Seltzer. The ad shows a tablet fizzing in a glass of water,
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FLAGPOLE: Is one type more objectionable legally than the other?
BLACKSTONE: As the law now stands, my answer is negative. I don't
know of any case where either type has been held actionable merely be-
cause of the identification of the competition.
HOFMEISTER: You still haven't told me why this isn't trademark in-
fringement.
BLACKSTONE: The reason is that in a trademark infringement case, you
must show that someone is using your mark, or something close to it, in
such a way as to create confusion, mistake or deception in the consumer
as to the source, origin or sponsorship of his goods or services." The
Glutz ad, as well as those in Jeff's file, make it quite clear that the adver-
tised goods or services are not those of the competitors whose trademarks
are shown.
HOFmEISTER: Well, Harlan, you certainly have given me a nice collec-
tion of reasons why the courts can't help me out. Now, what would happen
if I brought an action before the Federal Trade Commission? Aren't they
empowered to prevent injuries to competition?
BLACKSTONE: You don't give up easily, Rudy. The problem is that
a private citizen doesn't have the power to institute an FTC action.42
We can file our complaint with the FTC, but if they choose not to act
on it, that ends the matter. Although they are authorized to proceed in
cases involving unfair methods of competition or unfair or deceptive
acts or practices in interstate commerce, their primary interest in so
doing is to protect the public rather than injured competitors. There
is even authority for the proposition that if there is no public injury,
but only an injury to a single competitor, then the FTC has no juris-
diction. 3 Injured competitors often benefit from FTC actions, but, as
far as the Commission is concerned, that is incidental.
under the caption: "Quick, what is this? You're wrong. Come on, now. We know what
you think this is. And you know what you think this is. But it's not. . . . Resolve may
look the same but it's different." Although Alka-Seltzer is not mentioned by name, the
reference is dear. The copy proceeds to make comparative comments as to the superiority
of the new seltzer. Saturday Evening Post, Dec. 3, 1966, pp. 20-21.
41. A useful summary of the criteria for trademark infringement, with citations of
authority, is found in Restatement (Second), Torts § 717 (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1963).
For the infringement of a federally registered trademark see the Lanham Trade-Mark Act
§ 32(1), 60 Stat. 437 (1946), 15 U.S.C. § 1114(l) (1964).
42. See Federal Trade Commission Act § 5(b), 38 Stat. 719 (1914), 15 U-S.C. § 45(b)
(1964); Samson Crane Co. v. Union Natl Sales Co., 87 F. Supp. 218, 221 (D. Mass. 1949),
aff'd per curiam, 180 F.2d 896 (1st Cir. 1950).
43. FTC v. Klesner, 280 U.S. 19 (1929). But see Exposition Press, Inc. v. FTC, 295
F.2d 869 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 917 (1962); Moretrench Corp. v. FTC, 127
F.2d 792 (2d Cir. 1942). The Klesner case doubtless still overshadows the FTC's determina-
tion as to the cases with which it will proceed.
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HOFMEISTER: But I recall hearing about some cases in which the FTC
did issue cease and desist orders against disparagement.
BLACKSTONE: Yes, there have been many such cases.44 However, the
FTC proceeds against disparaging advertising only when it is false in
such a way as to threaten an injury to the public.
HOFMEISTER: So, if the advertisement is true, the FTC won't take
action just because it is disparaging?
BLACKSTONE: Correct.
FLAGPOLE: Doesn't the FTC define "truth" in a rather strange way,
though? It seems to me that they have acted in some cases where the de-
viation from the truth was very slight, and at times where the advertise-
ment in question was technically not false at all."
BLACKSTONE: Perhaps you're thinking of the recent case dealing with
television "Aiock-ups."' 4 Some of my other friends in advertising have
read that case as indicating that the FTC has discarded the requirement
of falsity. The FTC acted, I think, because they were concerned about
the dangers inherent in the use on television of purported experiments
and demonstrations to back up claims of product superiority. In the
particular case, it was established that the advertised shaving cream
just didn't shave sandpaper in the way shown on the television screen.
After reading the FTC's order closely, I'm convinced that it was directed
at a real and not an illusory evil. I don't think that it prevented the use
of all "mock-ups," but only those which created a false impression in the
minds of the viewers. So it is with the other cases in which the FTC seem-
ingly enjoined true advertising; the materiality of the deception appears
on a close analysis of the manner in which the ad misleads the consumer.47
44. These are collected in 2 Trade Reg. Rep. UIf 7655-70.
45. Baum, Truthful Disparagement Under the Federal Trade Commission Act, 51
Trademark Rep. 1081 (1961). "False advertisement" is defined in the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act § 15(a), 52 Stat. 116 (1938), 15 U.S.C. § 55(a) (1964).
46. FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374 (1965).
47. E.g., P. Lorillard Co. v. FTC, 186 F.2d 52 (4th Cir. 1950). The Reader's Digest
ran an article which was designed to show that cigarettes contained too much nicotine,
tars and resins, and that there was no significant difference among the leading brands In
the amounts contained. A chart of the results of tests on the seven best-selling brands
was included to substantiate the point. The maker of the cigarette which was lowest on
the chart, by an infinitesimal percentage, began to advertise that a Reader's Digest survey
had proved it to be lowest among the seven leading brands in "'nicotine . . . [and]
throat-irritating tars and resins.'" Id. at 57. The innuendo of the advertisement was that
there was a real difference between the advertised cigarette and the other leading brands
in content of nicotine, tars and resins. To people who had not read or remembered the ar-
ticle, the ad did convey a false impression. But see FTC v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 317 F.2d
669 (2d Cir. 1963).
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For the most part I disagree with the charges of "nit-picking" which have
been levelled against the FTC in deceptive advertising cases."
FLAGPOLE: I still have some reservations. Why can't the FTC spin
out a similar case of falsity against some of the ads in my file?
BLACKSTONE: As far as I can tell, none of them go beyond "puffing."
We're assuming that the ones which contain more specific allegations
are materially true. Nevertheless, I wouldn't be surprised if the FTC
were following these comparative ads with interest."9 As you probably
know, they have a program to monitor advertising in all sorts of media."
Whether they will act is quite another matter. Their jurisdiction is limited
to cases involving either an injury to competition or to the public interest.
Disparagement has not yet been held to be an injury to competition, as
distinguished from the individual competitors. If the basis for jurisdiction
is the injury to the public interest, then it's necessary to show that the
advertising tends to deceive at least a portion of the public in some real,
meaningful way. These questions of jurisdiction are not only for the
courts which review FTC decisions; they also condition the FTC's own
determination as to whether to proceed in a given case."'
HoFmrISTER: So if we asked the FTC to take action, they would tell
us that Glutz's insinuation that we can't match their flavor is not materi-
ally false?
BLA KSTONE: The FTC looks at falsity from the viewpoint of the
consumer. The only factual basis for the Glutz commercial is the true
one that they're first in national sales. The rest is purely their opinion,
and the consumer will take it as such. No, we don't have a reasonable
chance of getting the FTC to start an action. They don't have the man-
power or resources even to police all of the really bad advertisements in
interstate commerce. The worst effect which Glutz's non-specific compari-
sons could have is to cause a few customers to switch from one brand
of $1.45 a six-pack beer to another. Mind you, the FTC is not unwilling
to try the truth or falsity of statements concerning competing products
in a proper case, but it's not going to get involved in anything as sub-
jective as trying to determine whether one brand of beer really has a
flavor that others can't match.
48. But see Harwood, Once in a While the FTC Snorts, and Then Sleeps On, Wash-
ington Post, March 27, 1966, § E (Outlook), pp. 1, 3. See also FTC v. Mary Carter Paint
Co., 382 U.S. 46 (1965).
49. Commentary, supra note 37, at 33.
50. Letter from Charles A. Sweeny, Director, Bureau of Deceptive Practices, FTC, to
Professor Lawrence D. Gaughan, Dec. 9, 1966, on file with the Fordham Law Review.
51. The jurisdictional limitations on the FTC are discussed in Oppenheim, op. cit. supra
note 4, at 370-74.
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HOFMEISTER: Do you know of any other way to get at Glutz legally?
BLACKSTONE: I can't think of any other theory which has a decent
chance of success.52
HOFMEISTER: Can't we just tell the television network that if they
continue to run the Glutz ad, we'll take our business elsewhere?
BLACKSTONE: Unless they relented, we would have to back down or
else lose a major advertising outlet. If they did give in, on the other hand,
we run the risk of an antitrust violation.5" I'm afraid that that is not
the solution.
FLAGPOLE: My recommendation, Harlan, is that we reply in kind.
Glutz has asked for a fight and I think that we can give it to them. Our
52. Blackstone may have considered and rejected at least the following two possible
theories:
(1) Antidilution. A few states have enacted so-called "antidilution" statutes, such as
N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 368-d (Supp. 1966), which reads as folows: "Likelihood of injury
to business reputation or of dilution of the distinctive quality of a mark or trade name
shall be a ground for injunctive relief in cases of infringement of a mark registered or
not registered or in cases of unfair competition, notwithstanding the absence of competi-
tion between the parties or the absence of confusion as to the source of goods or services."
Despite the broad and somewhat ambiguous language of such statutes, no court interpreting
them thus far has taken them to do more than broaden the circumstances constituting
infringement beyond passing off and consumer confusion. Other such statutes are Conn.
Gen. Stat. Ann. § 35-11i(c) (Supp. 1965); Ga. Code Ann. § 106-115 (1956); Ill. Rev.
Stat. ch. 140, § 22 (1964) ; Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 110, § 7A (1954).
(2) Misappropriation. Attempts have been made to apply the amorphous and some-
what discredited, although not by any means defunct, doctrine of International News
Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918), to cases involving imitation of a com-
petitor's advertising. Liability has almost uniformly been refused, and none of the few
cases in which relief was granted bears any analogy to the advertisements in notes 37-40
supra. See 2 Callmann, supra note 4, § 61.4, at 901-04. It is interesting to note that Bristol-
Myers has copyrighted its ad, note 40 supra; usually the only copyright coverage for news-
paper and magazine advertising is that of the publisher. This may represent an attempt to
prevent the use of its copy in a reply ad. See Comment, Copyrights-The Protection of
Advertising, 5 Vill. L. Rev. 615 (1960), which also describes the application of the mis-
appropriation doctrine.
53. United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919), has not been overruled as to the
proposition that a unilateral refusal to deal, absent other elements in restraint of trade, does
not constitute a violation of the antitrust laws. United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362
U.S. 29 (1960). A conspiracy in restraint of trade, however, could easily be found in the situa-
tion of a media outlet which yielded to the coercion of a large nationwide advertiser to obtain
deletions or alterations in the advertising of one of its competitors. Cf. Radiant Burners, Inc.
v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1961). There is also a negligible possibility
of civil liability at common law. See Developments in the Law-Competitive Torts, 77 Harv.
L. Rev. 888, 926 (1964). For a discussion of the increasing concern over the effects of con-
centration in the brewing industry see United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546
(1966), and United States v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 253 F. Supp. 129 (N.D. Cal.), aff'd
mem., 385 U.S. 37 (1966).
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beer is aged (on an average) for three days longer than theirs, and it
contains two varieties of flavor-producing hops which they don't have.
Furthermore, we beat them in a comparative flavor test run by an inde-
pendent testing agency. Our idea is to run a series of ads entitled, "How
long, 0 Glutz?" Each ad will rhetorically ask them how long they can
remain first in sales after the public knows all of the reasons why Hof-
meister's is a superior beer. Naturally we will be able to prove every-
thing we say. We wouldn't run a picture of their bottle, but we would
refer to them by name.
BLACKSTONE: I would like to check the copy of the ads before giving
you any final opinion. For the reasons which we have discussed, though,
I would be very surprised if any of the ads were worded in such a way
as to raise legal objections. Which media do you intend to use?
FLAGPOLE: Television, newspapers and magazines. We also use bill-
board and transit advertising, but this particular campaign is not es-
pecially adapted to those media. We don't advertise on radio.
BLACKSTONE: Will you encounter any trouble in placing these ads? I
have heard that some of the media people disapprove of comparative
advertising. What about the so-called "self-regulation" in advertising?
I recall several notes in law journals which have dealt in part with this
subject.54 Also, Jeff, I have skimmed through the booklet on advertising
self-regulation which you gave to me."
FLAGPOLE: You know that I believe that self-regulation is the most
meaningful way of promoting advertising ethics in the public interest.
The main reason that there are few disparaging ads is that advertisers
normally don't ask for them, or advertising agencies won't develop them,
or the media will refuse to accept them. Our proposed series, of course,
won't be disparaging because there will be nothing untruthful or unfair
in any of the ads.
BLACICSTONE: Your booklet certainly elaborates on the virtues of self-
54. The most comprehensive such article is Note, The Regulation of Advcrtising, 56
Colum. L. Rev. 1018, 1078-96 (1956). On self-regulation in relation to disparagement see
Comment, 63 Yale L.J. 65, 66 (1953).
55. Advertising Advisory Comm., Dep't of Commerce, Self-Regulation in Advertising:
A Report on the Operations of Private Enterprise in an Important Area of Public Respon-
sibility (1964). This publication is the report of a committee of executives from various
trade associations in the advertising industry to Luther H. Hodges, then U.S. Secretary of
Commerce. The style of the tract indicates that its major intended use was as a public rela-
tions document; it is written in laymen's language which reminds one of magazine advertising
copy. Although it is a United States Government publication, it should not be taken as re-
flecting the official position of the Department of Commerce or any other branch of the
federal government. Nevertheless, if one discounts its bias, it is probably the best available
summary of the aims and problems of self-regulation in advertising.
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regulation, while blaming its limitations primarily upon the antitrust
laws. Self-regulation is a topic of much comment these days in your
advertising journals, such as Advertising Age and Printers' Ink. Last
week at a cocktail party I was also exposed to the other side as presented
by an attorney for one of the federal agencies and a rather disgruntled
former advertising executive. Their position was that self-regulation was
mainly a pious means of avoiding needed governmental controls and
substituting vague and unenforceable codes for really meaningful and
effective supervision. Now you'll probably agree with me, Jeff, that the
threat of increased legal controls over advertising is very present in the
minds of those advertising men who continue to sing the praises of self-
regulation. But I was moved to protest to my friends at the party that
there is more to the question than they had indicated. You said earlier
that unethical advertising may be useless or even harmful to one who uses
it. Beyond that, I like to think that many people in advertising are seri-
ously and honestly concerned about the ethics of their profession, even
when that concern may run contrary to a more immediate financial in-
terest. It's a question of pride in one's work, of a feeling that one is
doing something that is socially useful. So I believe, Jeff, that your feel-
ing for advertising ethics is genuine.
FLAGPOLE: Thank you, Harlan. Let me add that I would far prefer
to determine my own standards of ethics rather than to have them set by
some bureaucrat.
BLACKSTONE: There is no dearth of general pronouncements in the
advertising industry against unfair or disparaging attacks upon competi-
tors or their products, services or methods of doing business. What I am
interested in knowing is the extent to which it is considered ethically
wrong in advertising to identify "Brand X," even though there are no
elements of untruth or unfairness."6 Can you give me more specific in-
formation on this?
FLAGPOLE: Let me begin with a little background: many advertisers,
including practically all of the large ones, have their own internal ad-
vertising department and also a contract with at least one agency. Once
an individual ad or an advertising campaign is developed, it will be placed
with the appropriate media. An advertisement or commercial which is
bad for some reason or other probably won't reach the light of day. It
can be stopped at any one of the three levels. That is quite a gauntlet
to run, especially since legal advice is normally sought at each level.
BLACKSTONE: But what happens if the advertiser insists upon running
the ad despite legal or ethical objections?
FLAGPOLE: We try to talk him out of it. Sometimes we compromise. At
56. An excellent discussion of the controversy among advertising men over comparative
advertising is Commentary, supra note 37.
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times we decide that risking the advertiser's displeasure is the lesser
of two evils.
BLACKSTONE: But isn't it true that agencies and media don't lightly
offend national advertisers? It's not uncommon for advertisers to cancel
agency contracts, but the converse is somewhat like "man bites dog."
FLAGPOLE: The advertiser is the one who's spending the money, so
he usually does have the real power of decision. Still, most advertisers
appreciate the advice of their agencies. Furthermore, at all three levels,
there are associations of various types. These associations often prescribe
codes or standards of advertising ethics for their members.
HOFmEISTER: We belong to the Association of National Advertisers17
and the United States Brewers Association, Inc.' s Since the ANA repre-
sents diverse lines of business, it doesn't have any formal advertising
code. It does circulate a very useful little booklet with a rule-of-thumb for
honest advertising,59 but there's no rule against identifying competitors.
As for the brewer's association, it has established a five-man Advertising
Review Panel to hear charges of alleged violations of advertising ethics.
It's not considered unethical, though, merely to refer to the competition.
BLACKSTONE: Does the Advertising Review Panel have any authority
to enforce its decisions, or does it operate on the basis of judgment and
persuasion only?
HoFMEIsTER: It has moral force.
FLAGPOLE: It is my understanding that if a trade asociation had any
real sanctions, it might be charged with an antitrust violation.
BLACKSTONE: Yes, your booklet gives this as the main reason for the
lack of effective enforcement powers by the various trade associations
concerned with advertising.6" I think that the argument is overstated
if the antitrust laws are taken to prevent the policing of ethical standards
of advertising where there are no ulterior motives.6 I'll admit, though,
57. 155 E. 44th St, New York, N.Y. 10017. The ANA's membership consists of leading
national advertisers, including 86 out of the top 100. Other important advertiser associations
include the Association of Better Business Bureaus, Inc., 405 Lexington Ave, New York,
N.Y. 10017, and the Association of Industrial Advertisers, 271 Madison Ave, New York,
N.Y. 10017.
58. 535 Fifth Ave., New York, N.Y. 10017. This is a trade association for large or national
brewers. An organization for smaller or regional brewers is the Brewers Association of Amer-
ica, 541 W. Randolph St, Chicago, Ill. 60606. For information concerning trade associations
see 1 Ruffner, Encyclopedia of Associations (4th ed. 1964).
59. "An advertisement is honest when objective facts which bear upon the product or
service advertised fulfill in all material respects the understanding regarding them that is
generated in people by the advertisement when observed in the way or ways that they
normally perceive it." Well, Legal Rules of the Road to Honest Advertising 4 (1960).
60. Advertising Advisory Comm., supra note 55, at 11, 33, 100.
61. Apparently the chairman of the FTC would disagree with Blackstone's observation,
at least in the event that a really effective sanction (such as a boycott) were available.
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that such sanctions could provide a machinery which by its very presence
would encourage other coercive activity. A good way to avoid this is to
set up the industry regulations under the aegis of the FTC as Trade Prac-
tice Conference Rules. 2 But such rules have not been established for
either advertising or brewing, and even if they were, they wouldn't go
beyond proscribing false advertising and untrue disparagement.
FLAGPOLE: My agency is a member of a very important trade associa-
tion, the American Association of Advertising Agencies,"3 which we have
nicknamed the 4 A's. Our Standards of Practice contains a "Creative
Code" which bars "comparisons which unfairly disparage a competitive
product or service." 4
BLACKSTONE: How is the code enforced?
FLAGPOLE: We have a Committee for the Interchange of Opinion on
Objectionable Advertising, which is operated jointly by the ANA and the
4 A's. The committee consists of twenty executives, ten from each orga-
nization. Its purpose is to review complaints against advertising and to
deal with them on a confidential basis. If the objection is deemed serious
and the advertiser or agency does not comply with the committee's
recommended corrective action, then the noncompliance is reported back
to the board of directors of the appropriate organization. The organiza-
tion's action can include expulsion of the offender from membership."
BLACKSTONE: Do you know of any advertiser or agency which has
actually been expelled for such a violation?
FLAGPOLE: No, not that I know of. But the threat is there.
BLACKSTONE: Does the 4 A's have any official position on comparative
advertising?
FLAGPOLE: Yes, they do. It is stated in a policy statement adopted on
February 15, 1966. (Removes policy statement from briefcase and reads
it aloud."") The most important thing about this is that the 4 A's looks
Address by Paul Rand Dixon, Advertising Ass'n of the West Annual Convention, June 28,
1966, summarized in Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep., July 5, 1966, p. A-6; cf. United States v.
American Ass'n of Advertising Agencies, Inc., 1956 Trade Cas. ff 68361 (S.D.N.Y. 1956)
(broad consent judgment). However, that case involved price-fixing, Likewise, another case
often cited in this context, Fashion Originators' Guild of America, Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457
(1941), involved restraint of trade.
62. These are collected in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. 111l 40000-41227.
63. 200 Park Ave., New York, N.Y. 10017.
64. American Ass'n of Advertising Agencies, Standards of Practice § 1(d) (Apr. 28, 1962)
(copy on file with the Fordham Law Review).
65. Advertising Advisory Comm., supra note 55, at 39-40.
66. The full "Policy Statement on Comparative Advertising" reads as follows: "While tile
Board of Directors of the American Association of Advertising Agencies believes whole-
heartedly in competition in advertising, it does not believe in advertising which untruthfully
or unfairly depicts or disparages competitive products or services. Nor does it believe In
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with disfavor on ads or commercials which show a competitor's package
or trademark without his permission.
BLACKSTONE: Why aren't advertisements which violate this policy
deemed objectionable simply on that basis? Or perhaps I'm assuming in-
correctly that they aren't. I guess that I'm puzzled because some of the
ads in your file which seem to contravene the policy have appeared since
it was promulgated.
FLAGPOLE: Well, the policy statement is not like a code or regulation.
It's simply a statement of the beliefs of the people who guide the orga-
nization. The board of directors of the 4 A's only meant to discourage
such ads; I don't think they meant to change the criteria for deciding
what constitutes a serious objection to advertising.
HOFMEISTER: The Glutz commercial certainly violates the policy, al-
though our reply wouldn't. It seems to me that they are also unfairly
depicting our product and trading upon our reputation.
BLACKSTONE: Perhaps I could get a court of equity to accept the 4 A's
policy statement as evidence of developing commercial custom or ethics.
Then we might make some new law!
FLAGPOLE: I agree with you, Rudy, that the Glutz ad violates the last
sentence of the 4 A's policy. It doesn't seem to me, though, that they
depicted our product unfairly. The picture of our bottle on television
didn't make it look smaller or less desirable than theirs. Likewise, they're
not trading on our reputation any more than our campaign would trade on
their name or advertising. In my opinion, the big difference between our
ads and their commercial is that ours will give the consuming public some
useful information.
BLACKSTONE: You haven't answered my question about possible prob-
lems with the media.
FLAGPOLE: Each of the media has at least one trade association, but to
my knowledge none of them prohibits the type of campaign that we
propose. As far as newspapers and magazines are concerned, neither the
American Newspaper Publishers Association 7 nor the Magazine Pub-
lishers Association68 maintains any general codes or standards. They
prefer to leave questions of policy as to the acceptance or rejection of
advertising that uses another product's trademark or brand name in an effort to trade on
the reputation which the competitive brand has built through advertising and public accep-
tance. It believes that such use of competitors' brand names, packages, and trademarks
without the express permission of such competitors should be discouraged." American Ass'n
of Advertising Agencies, Policy Statement on Comparative Advertising, Feb. 15, 1966 (copy
on file with the Fordham Law Review).
67. 750 Third Ave., New York, N.Y. 10017.
68. 575 Lexington Ave., New York, N.Y. 10022.
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advertising to their individual members.69 As you doubtless know, a few
magazines, such as the Reader's Digest, will not accept any beer
advertising.
BLACKSTONE: Don't some newspapers have a policy against the ac-
ceptance of advertising which refers to a competitor?
FLAGPOLE: Yes, but that doesn't apply to us. The fact that we advertise
nationally makes the difference; newspapers seldom reject or make copy
revisions in national advertising. But a reputable newspaper will police
local or retail advertising quite closely. °
HOFMEISTER: Did you say, Harlan, that most of the abuses in advertis-
ing are on the local level?
BLACKSTONE: That seems to be so in the case of deceptive advertising.
But it may be the other way around with some other questionable adver-
tising practices, such as subliminal advertising and the overworking of sex
in ads.
FLAGPOLE: Thank you, Vance Packard! Anyway, in addition to their
own guidelines on advertising acceptability, many magazines and news-
papers subscribe generally to an association set of standards, such as the
4 A's "Creative Code" or the Advertising Code of American Business.71'
This latter code was developed jointly by three major associations con-
cerned with advertising. Neither of these standards, though, goes beyond
discouraging the use of untrue or unfair disparagement in advertising.
BLACKSTONE: What about television and radio? Isn't their self-regula-
tion stricter than in the other media?
FLAGPOLE: Yes, because of the codes promulgated by the National
Association of Broadcasters.72 Both The Television Code7 and The Radio
69. Letter from Donald R. McVay, Ass't Gen. Manager, Am. Newspaper Publishers Ass'n,
to Professor Lawrence D. Gaughan, Nov. 16, 1966; Letter from Katheryn Powers, Magazine
Advertising Bureau of Magazine Publishers Ass'n, to Professor Lawrence D. Gaughan, Nov.
8, 1966. Both letters are on file with the Fordham Law Review.
70. For example, the following statement appears in N.Y. Times, Standards of Advertising
Acceptability 6 (1964): "Statements or representations which refer to the goods, price,
service or advertising of any competitor are not acceptable." However, this policy Is directed
at retail (i.e., local) rather than national advertising. Letter from Vincent Redding, N.Y.
Times, to Professor Lawrence D. Gaughan, Nov. 25, 1966, on file with the Fordham Law
Review.
71. Art. 4 of this Code reads as follows: "Disparagement . . . Advertising shall offer
merchandise or service on its merits, and refrain from attacking competitors unfairly or dis-
paraging their products, services or methods of doing business." This code, which is undated,
is published by the Advertising Federation of America (AFA), 655 Madison Ave., New York,
N.Y. 10021, the Advertising Association of the West (AAW), 337 World Trade Center, San
Francisco, Calif. 94111, and the Association of Better Business Bureaus, Inc., 405 Lexington
Ave., New York, N.Y. 10017. A copy of The Advertising Code of American Business Is on
file with the Fordham Law Review.
72. 1771 N St., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036.
73. National Ass'n of Broadcasters, The Television Code (11th ed. Aug. 1966).
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Code74 are administered by a strong enforcement agency called the Code
Authority. The codes are kept up to date through frequent revisions by a
Code Review Board. Violators of the codes may be expelled from the NAB
and, in fact, some expulsions have taken place.78 I don't think that there
is anything comparable among the other media.
HoFmmIsTmR: Why is that?
BLACKSTONE: I can guess. Radio and television are subject to more
stringent governmental controls than the other media, at least on paper.
The regulatory body charged with administering the federal laws dealing
with broadcasting is the Federal Communications Commission. The
federal license of each radio and television station expires every three
years, and it is the FCC which must approve applications for renewal.
License renewal is subject to the FCC's determination that the statutory
standard has been met; that is, that the "public interest, convenience, and
necessity would be served thereby."7 The vagueness of this provision has
led many broadcasters to be rather wary of the FCC, and so the more
extensive scheme of self-regulation is certainly related to the desire to
avoid governmental alternatives. In fact, the FCC has been rather benign.
Perhaps there is a feeling among some broadcasters that the FCC is a
"epaper tiger;" membership in the NAB is far from unanimous, and the
fact that there have been expulsions may indicate only that not everyone
considers the loss of NAB membership or certification to be a very serious
sanction.77
FLAGPOLE: Aren't you overlooking an important fact, Harlan? The real
influence of The Television Code is to be found in its effect on the national
networks; all of them subscribe to it.78 I might add that some of the code
provisions are not only strict, but also specific and unambiguous.70
BLACKCSTONE: Judging from the appearance of the Glutz commercial on
74. National Ass'n of Broadcasters, The Radio Code (12th ed. Aug. 1966).
75. Advertising Advisory Comm, supra note 55, at 86.
76. 66 Stat. 714 (1952), 47 U.S.C. § 307(d) (1964).
77. Editorial, Assistance in Disguise, Advertising Age, Dec. 12, 1966, p. 22. The article
referred to therein is Barrow, The Attainment of Balanced Program Service in Television, 52
Va. L. Rev. 633 (1966). Compare the comment of judge Wisdom in Carter Prods., Inc. v.
FTC, 323 F.2d 523 (5th Cir. 1963): "On television truth is relative." Id. at 526.
78. Letter from William H. Tankersley, Vice President, Program Practices, CBS Tele-
vision Network, Division of Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., to Fordham Law Revew,
Feb. 8, 1967; Letter from Mortimer Weinbach, Ass't Gen. Counsel & Vice President, Ameri-
can Broadcasting Companies, Inc., to Professor Lawrence D. Gaughan, Dec. 30, 1966; Letter
from Ernest Lee Jahncke, Jr., Vice President, Standards and Practices, National Broadcasting
Company, Inc., to Professor Lawrence D. Gaughan, Dec. 13, 1966. These letters are on file
with the Fordham Law Review.
79. E.g., National Ass'n of Broadcasters, The Television Code art. LX(5) (11th ed. 1966):
"The advertising of hard liquor (distilled spirits) is not acceptable."
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a national network, I'd guess that nothing in The Television Code covers
comparative advertising.
FLAGPOLE: That's not quite correct. As a matter of fact, a little over a
year ago the Code Review Board proposed an amendment which would
probably have kept the Glutz commercial and our planned campaign off
television. The old code provision merely forbade advertising copy which
dealt unfairly with the competition."0 It was proposed to change this so as
to prohibit references to a competitor or his wares which, expressly or by
implication, would "'detract from or belittle the product or service
mentioned.' ,,"1 We understood that this wording would have given the
Code Authority the power to turn down any commercial which would be
derogatory to a competitor, even though it was purely factual.8 2 In my
opinion, such a principle would have been unrealistic. Fortunately, the
proposal was rejected after much discussion pro and con. 3 A compromise
substitute provision is now in the code. After stating that a product or
service should be advertised on its own merits, it provides that advertising
should "refrain by identification or other means from discreditiig, dis-
paraging or unfairly attacking" the competition.84 The provision in The
Radio Code is slightly stronger in its wording."' In practice, these pro-
visions have not served to eliminate comparative advertising from radio
and television.
BLACKSTONE: Well, this discussion of self-regulation has been very
interesting. Do you plan to go ahead with the campaign?
FLAGPOLE: We're not sure yet. Rudy has some misgivings. My feeling
is that the campaign will attract interest and will be doing the public a
service at the same time.
HoFMEISTER: Something still bothers me about naming a competitor.
It's Glutz's fault, though. They started all this.
80. "Advertising copy should contain no claims dealing unfairly with competitors, com-
peting products, or other industries, professions or institutions." National Ass'n of Broad-
casters, The Television Code art. X(6) (10th ed. 1965). The same provision is found In
National Ass'n of Broadcasters, The Radio Code art. II(C) (9) (11th ed. 1965).
81. Commentary, supra note 37, at 33.
82. Advertising Age, June 6, 1966, p. 1.
83. Advertising Age, June 13, 1966, pp. 1, 20.
84. The full provision reads: "Advertising should offer a product or service on its positive
merits and refrain by identification or other means from discrediting, disparaging or unfairly
attacking competitors, competing products, other industries, professions or institutions."
National Ass'n of Broadcasters, The Television Code art. X(6) (11th ed. 1966).
85. The Radio Code adds the following provision to that of The Television Code: "Any
identification or comparison of a competitive product or service, by name, or other means,
should be confined to specific facts rather than generalized statements or conclusions, unless
such statements or conclusions are not derogatory in nature." National Ass'n of Broadcasters,
The Radio Code art. 11(C)(9) (12th ed. 1966).
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BLACKSTONE: Maybe your doubts have their roots in your old world
background, Rudy. There is a general principle in continental law that
you can't refer in advertising to your competitor or to his products,
services or business methods when you're doing so for a competitive
purpose."6
HOFM EISTER: That is a great difference from the American law. I'd like
to know how this principle works in practice. What do they mean by a
reference to a competitor?
BLACKSTONE: I'll limit my discussion to the French law, Rudy. The
French consider a reference to be anything which is reasonably likely to
indicate the identity of the competitive firm or product. It's not at all
necessary that the subject of the reference actually be named in the ad-
vertisement. Let me illustrate this with a recent French case."1 The makers
of the Citroen automobile had been advertising that "the way a Citroen
holds the road has become proverbial." Later, in advertising describing its
car, the competitive Simca company included the statement that "the old
proverbs are all worn out." After looking at the facts, the French court
found that the implication of the statement was clear and that Simca was
therefore liable for unfair competition.
HOFMEISTER: The car rental company which keeps referring to "No. 1"
would have to advertise differently in France, wouldn't they?
BLACKSTONE: They certainly would. The intriguing thing about the
French law, though, is not its approach to the question of the way in which
the advertisement identifies the plaintiff or its product. After all, American
courts will sometimes permit a plaintiff in a defamation case to show by
extrinsic evidence that the reference was to him. s No, the really interest-
86. The classical study of the attitude of French, German and Swiss law towards "truth-
ful disparagement" is Wolff, Unfair Competition by Truthful Disparagement, 47 Yale L.J.
1304 (1938). For a discussion of the French law see Derenberg, The Influence of the French
Code Civil on the Modem Law of Unfair Competition, 4 Am. J. Comp. L. 1, 8-16 (1955);
Wilcox, An Analysis of the French Law of Unfair Competition Under Article 1382 of the
French Civil Code 62-70 (1937) (unpublished thesis in Columbia Law School Library). An-
other useful source is Rotondi, Unfair Competition in Europe, 7 Am. J. Comp. L. 327, 343-
46 (1958). Surveys of the law of a number of countries relating to comparative advertising
and disparagement may be found in 1 World Unfair Competition Law 198-224, 336-55
(Pinner ed. 1965).
References in French include the loose-leaf Juris-Classeur, Concurrence diloyale pt. XXV
(Dainigrement); Mermillod, Essai sur la notion de concurrence d(loyale en France et aux
Etats Unis 77-81 (1954) ; Pouillet, Trait6 des marques de fabrique et de a concurrence dd-
loyale en tous genres §§ 1175-95 (6th ed. 1912).
87. Soci6ut Simca v. Socifti CitroEn, Cour d'Appel de Paris (4e ch.), Feb. 14, 1958, [1959]
Annales de la proprit6 industrielle, artistique et littraire [hereinafter cited as Annales] 90
(Fr.).
88. E.g., cases cited note 25 supra.
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ing thing is that the French courts don't bother to inquire into the truth
or falsity of the defendant's statement.
FLAGPOLE: Do you mean that they assume it to be untrue in the absence
of any contrary proof?
BLACKSTONE: No, that's the whole point. The gist of the complaint is
the reference to the competition. Once this is shown, the truth or falsity of
the statement is generally considered to be immaterial."
FLAGPOLE: What a strange principlel Does this mean that even a
general reference, such as in the ad "Bufferin acts twice as fast as aspirin,"
is bad under French law?
BLACKSTONE: If the disparagement is generic, that is, if it refers to a
type of goods or service rather than to those of specific and identifiable
makers or sellers, then it falls within one of the few exceptions to the
principle. 0
FLAGPOLE: Suppose that I inform the consumers about the deficiencies
in my competitor's product just as a public service. Everything I say is
true and I just want to prevent people from being harmed or swindled.
That would be all right, wouldn't it?
BLACKSTONE: I'm afraid not. The French position is that since you are
a competitor, at least part of your reason for circulating the advertisement
is to help your own business.9
FLAGPOLE: Isn't that a rather silly attitude? The public suffers because
of an abstract notion that you cannot name a competitor in your
advertising.
BLACKSTONE: Is it really that bad? After all, if you are truly interested
89. A good example of a case in which the French court assumed the defendant's state-
ment to be true, but nevertheless found liability, is Isolfeu v. Wanner, Cour d'Appel de Paris
(4e ch.), Feb. 1, 1934, [19341 Annales 227 (Fr.).
90. A rather well-known case which illustrates this proposition is Chambre syndicale des
brcileurs de caf6 v. Socid6t6 anonyme du caf6 Sanka, Trib. comm. de ]a Seine, Nov. 19, 1931,
aff'd, Cour d'Appel de Paris (4e ch.), April 30, 1935, [19361 Annales 32 (Fr.). The defendant
had advertised that "coffee with caffeine causes heart trouble, distressing palpitations, ner-
vous disorders, discomfort, crushing insomnia, stomach trouble, etc." The disparagement was
held to be generic and thus not actionable. It is interesting to compare this case with Perma-
Maid Co. v. FTC, 121 F.2d 282 (6th Cir. 1941), in which the issuance of a cease and desist
order against disparagement of aluminum in cooking utensils was upheld where statements
of respondent, a manufacturer of stainless steel cooking utensils, were found to be false.
Generic disparagement is only slightly different from the cases where the injured plaintiffs
are members of an identifiable group; in this latter case, an action is generally allowed. For
example, the arms makers of the city of Saint-Etienne recovered against a Paris gunsmith In
Chambre syndicale des fabricants d'armes de Saint-Etienne v. Pigeon, Trib. comm. de ]a
Seine, June 27, 1907, [1908] 2 Annales 86 (Fr.).
91. E.g., Socit6 universelle d'explosifs et de produits chimiques v. Sod6t6 franqaise des
poudres de sfiret6, Trib. comm. de la Seine, Aug. 8, 1908, [19081 2 Annales 92 (Fr.).
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in doing the public a service, you can complain to the government or to
some impartial source. Or very likely your competitor will have been
guilty of false advertising, so you can bring an action against him for that.
An advertiser who really wants to protect the public will find the means.
If he can't, it's probably because he doesn't have a very good or relevant
complaint against his competitor.
FLAGPOLE: I had understood that it was very difficult for an injured
competitor to bring an action for false advertising.
BLACKSTONE: It is in American law,92 but the French law generally
permits such an action.93
FLAGPOLE: Well, I still don't understand what's behind the French
attitude.
BLAcKsToNE: I'm not an authority on the policies which led to the
development of the French principle against comparative advertising. Is it
a question of the relative importance of business ethics as against plain old
self-interest? I don't know. It has been said that the ethics of commerce
are higher in continental Europe than in the United States, but I don't
think that it would help us much to check that out. The French had a
full-fledged private law of unfair competition years before we did, 4 but
it's also true that our antitrust laws were developed long before theirs.
The Europeans seem to have been more concerned than we over the
development of orderly ground rules for competition. And, of course, the
best way to ensure an orderly marketplace is to elevate the system of
commercial ethics to the level of legally enforceable principles.
FLAGPOLE: It sounds to me as if the French may have actually cramped
or restricted competition under the guise of keeping it fair and orderly.
BLACKSTONE: I suppose that it's safe to say that the continental at-
92. The difficulties facing a plaintiff at common law are illustrated by California Apparel
Creators v. Wieder of Cal., Inc., 162 F.2d 893 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 816 (1947).
The Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act, which has already been enacted in a few states,
provides for injunctive relief in enumerated cases of false advertising at the suit of one
Ilikely to be damaged" thereby. Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act §§ 2, 3. Examples
of other somewhat similar statutes are Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 42-115(d), (e) (Supp. 1965);
Ga. Code Ann. §§ 106-501, -502 (Supp. 1966). For a discussion of the effect of Lanham
Trade-Mark Act § 43(a), 60 Stat. 441 (1946), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1964), see Developments
in the Law-Competitive Torts, 77 Harv. L. Rev. 888, 907 (1964).
93. Cases are collected in Juris-Classeur, Concurrence d6loyale pts. 3II (PublicitO ...
mensong~re) & XXII (Prise de faux titres ou de fausse qualit6).
94. The French law of unfair competition (concurrence ddloyale) was well-developed by
the middle of the last half of the 19th century. A leading American writer of the period used
the developments in French law to support his arguments for an expansion in the American
law. Browne, Trade-Marks § 43 (2d ed. 1885). However, at the turn of the century, unfair
competition cases were still being referred to in this country as "cases analogous to trade-
marks." Cushing, On Certain Cases Analogous to Trade-Marks, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 321 (1891).
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titude towards competition is more conservative than ours. A greater sense
of adherence to tradition, of safeguarding family interests and of slow
rather than sudden accretion of wealth underlies their outlook. American
businessmen have tended to run greater risks in the hope of more sub-
stantial rewards.
FLAGPOLE: Isn't this attitude changing, though?
BLACKSTONE: Yes, I think that it is. Some of my clients seem much
more willing to settle for a steady share of the market than their fathers or
grandfathers would have been. Still, although there may have been some
change in emphasis towards a greater interest in commercial order and
stability, I certainly wouldn't jump to the conclusion that tough, hard
competition has become a thing of the past in this country. Such is
certainly not the case in American advertising, which seems if anything
to be more competitive than ever. The subject we have been discussing-
comparative advertising-furnishes a good example of the continued vigor
of American competition. Maybe the business and advertising men who
most oppose comparative advertising do so in part because of a concern
over the potentially sudden and violent effects from this "dangerous new
weapon."
HOFMEISTER: If I may intrude upon this discussion of economic phil-
osophy, I'd like to ask whether the adoption of the Code Napoleon might
not account in part for the difference in the French law.
BLACKSTONE: The codifications of Napoleon created the climate for the
development of the French law of unfair competition. To start with, the
codes gave French law what you might call a "fresh start." Then, a system
of commercial courts with elected businessman judges was created."
These judges could apply code provisions on tort liability as broad as any
in the world,96 and indeed they used them imaginatively to mold the new
law of unfair competition. In this country, by contrast, the development of
a private law of unfair competition was hindered by the common law
tradition and, later, by the federal system. 7
95. Amos & Walton, Introduction to French Law 343 (2d ed. 1963). On the appellate
level, commercial and civil cases are beard by the same courts, although in different chambers.
The appellate courts are composed only of professional judges.
96. The basis for much of the French law of unfair competition is Code Civil art. 1382
(Fr. 65th ed. Dalloz 1966), which reads: "Any [intentional] act by which a person causes
damage to another makes the person by whose fault the damage occurred liable to make
reparation for such damage." For information as to the manner in which this provision was
applied by the courts and the advantages in the judicial development of such a body of law
see Wilcox, op. cit. supra note 86, at 6, 76.
97. Unfair competition is one of the areas of American law where the effects of Erie R.R.
v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), have been most felt. For an excellent discussion of the
problems of the federal system in relation to the law of unfair competition see Peterson, The
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FLAGPOLE: Well, be that as it may, I'm still bothered by the principle
that a completely true and fair ad may be actionable merely because it
refers to a competitor or his merchandise.
BLACKSTONE: The charm of the French principle is that it is easy to
administer. The courts aren't faced with the necessity to adjudicate merits
of conflicting products and claims.
FLAGPOLE: It may be easy to administer such a principle, but is that
sufficient justification for it? I think that it is essential for the consuming
public to have at its disposal as much information as possible about the
respective merits of goods and services. After all, that's a vital function
of advertising-to furnish information.
BLACKSTONE: The advertiser who puts out useful and reliable informa-
tion concerning his own wares definitely performs a public service. I even
sympathize with a clever advertising campaign which doesn't tell me a
thing, if the advertiser is able to sprinkle a humdrum trip to the shopping
center with the stardust of imagination. Now I'll grant that some of these
comparative ads are a genuine source of consumer information. For this
reason, I would reject the continental approach if there were a dear, easy
way to separate truth from falsity, factual claims from those which are not
factual, and relevant material from that which is irrelevant. But there
isn't. As I look through your file, Jeff, I'm afraid that I see too many ads
which make references to the competition or comparisons that aren't
really useful or meaningful. I prefer to leave the comparing and rating to
independent, impartial organizations, such as the ones which publish
Consumer Reports9" and the Consumer Bulletin." I might even favor the
creation of a separate federal department for consumer protection if it
were properly constituted.
FLAGPOLE: Protection can be carried too far, Harlan. The average
consumer is intelligent enough to make up his own mind as to how he will
spend his money. I dread the thought of another federal agency to inter-
fere with business freedom; there are too many already.
BLACKSTONE: Obviously the purchaser is going to have to make the
final decision among competing goods or services. My concern is that the
source of the information upon which he bases his choice is a group which
is primarily interested in his welfare.
FLAGPOLE: But why can't he consult other available sources as well?
You admit that at least some of these comparative ads have value. I think
Legislative Mandate of Sears and Compco: A Plea for a Federal Law of Unfair Competition,
69 Dick. L. Rev. 347 (1965), 56 Trademark Rep. 16 (1966).
98. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 256 Washington St., Mount Vernon, N.Y.
10550.
99. Consumers' Research, Inc., Washington, N.J. 07882.
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that they add a refreshing candor or frankness to advertising. As long as
the comparisons aren't untrue or unfair, what harm do they do? I just
cannot agree that all of the rules ought to change whenever advertising
contains a reference to the competitor. Advertising doesn't have to relate
to the real merits of the thing advertised, as long as it isn't dishonest.
BLACKSTONE: Aren't you being inconsistent? A moment ago you justi-
fied comparative advertising as performing a useful service. Now you're
saying that advertising need not be informative at all.
FLAGPOLE: If comparative advertising really informs the consumer,
then that is an independent justification for its existence. Certainly, the
main purpose of advertising is to sell. An advertiser should be free to sell
in any way he wishes, unless his advertising is legally or ethically objec-
tionable. Any other restriction upon this freedom would be a serious en-
croachment upon the privilege to do business and to compete as one
wishes.
BLACKSTONE: Limitations upon commercial freedom may and have
been based upon economic policies and the public interest, even though
there is nothing ethically wrong with the proscribed activity. But let us
consider an ethical question which relates to the subject under discussion.
What about these ads in which a company uses the name, package or
trademark of its better-known competitor in order to get a "free ride on
the coattails" of its rival's reputation through a claim of equality or supe-
riority? Isn't that unethical?
FLAGPOLE: Unless there's more to it than that, I don't think it is an
ethical violation. But I think that an even better answer is based on eco-
nomic policy, to use your term. Many people continue to be worried about
bigness, concentration and oligopoly in manufacturing and selling. Don't
these ads provide one good means by which a smaller company may attract
public attention?
BLACKSTONE: Yes, but so does trademark infringement.
FLAGPOLE: You pointed out an important difference in answer to one of
Rudy's questions about the law. In a case of trademark infringement, the
public is made to think that there is some connection between the two
companies, that they're the same, or that one has sponsored or certified
the other. In these ads, once the consumer has done business with the
smaller company it has to stand or fall on its own merits.
BLACKSTONE: The trouble is that big companies could use this device,
too, either to introduce new products"0 or to expand to new markets. A
smaller company which makes just one product, even where that product
leads the field, could be severely hurt by the entry of a corporate giant,
100. E.g., note 38 supra.
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with its huge advertising budget, into competition. And I don't think you
can make a rule which says that it's all right for a smaller firm to use such
advertising, but that when a bigger company does it, it's wrong.
FLAGPOLE: Well, I still think that the consumer ought to be free to
decide and that the freedom of advertisers shouldn't be curtailed. I have
one other question concerning the principle against references to competi-
tors. Suppose that a French company ignores the law and engages in
comparative advertising. If the competitor whose goods are mentioned
chooses not to take legal action, then the French government doesn't step
in and stop the ads, does it?
BLACKSTONE: No, at least so long as there's no false advertising
involved. 1' 1
FLAGPOLE: So that if the competitor chooses instead to run a series of
ads in reply, then that's all right?
BLACICSTONE: Only within rather narrow limits. The reply must be
circumspect; it may not go beyond whatever is really necessary to rebut
the attack made upon one's firm or product. Furthermore, it must be fair
and truthful. Otherwise, it is said, the injured competitor is taking the
business of the courts into his own hands, and that is not permitted.1"
If the principle were otherwise, the matter could get out of hand, and
the very commercial order which the law seeks to promote could be de-
stroyed.
FLAGPOLE: But if both competitors thought that the fight was attract-
ing public interest it could go on for a long time. Maybe the only ones
who would be hurt would be the other companies who didn't participate."
BLACKSTONE: Dreadful, but true! Or two branches of the same
company might fake a fight, again in the interest of public attention."°
HoFm STER:Would our planned campaign in reply to Glutz be per-
mitted under French law?
BLACKSTONE: Probably not. You're not really controverting anything
that they have said about being first in sales; the gist of your campaign
is whether their market leadership is justified, and that's another thing.
FLAGPOLE: I assume that you're not in favor of our planned series.
BLACIKSTONE: Oh, you know me, I'm just an old utopian. I still like
101. Law of July 2, 1963, arts. 5, 6, in Code de Commerce 900 (Fr. 62d ed. Dalloz 1966).
102. E.g., Raguet v. Socit Maggi, Cour d'Appel de Paris (4e cb.), Nov. 6, 1913, [1914]
2 Annales 24 (Fr.).
103. Such could be the result of the battle between Hertz and Avis. For a late account
of the continuing fight see Time, Dec. 23, 1966, p. 65. But apparently others are getting
into the act. See the "no-gimmick" ad of Econo-Car Int'l, Inc., described in Advertising
Age, Jan. 2, 1967, p. 78.
104. A Milwaukee shoe manufacturer is doing just this, See N.Y. Times, Oct. 19, 1966,
p. 72, col. 3.
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the French approach; it's clear-cut, and it compels the consumer to look
to the proper sources for his comparative information. But given the
present state of the law and the fact that I'd like to see you give
Glutz a nice drubbing, well, I guess I can't object. Rudy, you've been
listening to our good-natured debate. What's your preference?
HOFMEISTER: Maybe I'm one of those conservatives that you were
talking about; the continental principle against naming competitors
appeals to me. But the main concern I have is to advance the interests
and business of my company in the most effective way. So we'll study
Jeff's proposal from the standpoint of public appeal.
BLACKSTONE: It's going to be interesting to see where this all will end.
Maybe there will be so many comparative ads that the public will stop
paying attention to them. That could be more effective in curbing them
than any legal principle. I don't expect any change in the law."'0
FLAGPOLE: I'll agree with you, Harlan, that the situation could get out
of hand.
BLACKSTONE: And I'll admit, Jeff, that these comparative ads have
been quite intriguing.
HOFPMEISTER: Gentlemen, I thank you both. I'll let you know of our
decision as soon as possible.
105. The Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act proscribes disparagement, but only
when it is factually untrue. Section 2 (a) (8) of that act provides that a person engages in a
deceptive trade practice when, in the course of his business, he "disparages the goods, serv-
ices, or business of another by false or misleading representation of fact." Of similar import
is the wording of the Lindsay bill, a proposal to create a general federal private remedy for
unfair competition. Section 2(3)(B) defines "unfair commercial activity" to include "the use
for purposes of profit of any statement of fact as to the goods or services of either party
which is false or misleading by reason either of misstatement or omission of a material fact."
S. 2068, H.R. 5514, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965). In any event, the passage of the Lindsay
bill is unlikely. If comparative advertising were more generally considered to be violative of
good standards of business ethics, it is conceivable that a court of equity might use such fact
as additional substantiation for the grant of an injunction. Section 2(3) (C) of the Lindsay
bill reflects the feeling of some that commercial ethics ought to be supported by injunctive
relief; it provides that "the commission for purposes of profit of any other act or practice
which is likely to deceive or which violates reasonable standards of commercial ethics" may
be enjoined at the suit of any person who is damaged or likely to be damaged thereby.
